In this paper I show that if risk-averse agents prefer both to be richer in absolute terms and to be richer than their peers (relative-wealth concerns), then 1) they will prefer positive correlation between their payos and the payos of other agents, and 2) they will be averse to negative correlation between payos. I test these theoretical predictions in a laboratory experiment. I nd that subjects prefer positively correlated payos over risk-free and negatively correlated payos. Furthermore, subjects who by observing other participants' payos signal stronger relative-wealth concerns, also show stronger aversion to negatively correlated payos. Finally, women appear to be concerned about other agents' payos more than men. This novel evidence has implications that help explain why rms apparently use prot-sharing and broad-based incentives contracts too extensively, and why Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) contracts are scarcely used in common compensation practice.
Introduction
Two puzzles have been put forth by several studies in the compensation literature: the extensive use by rms of broad-based incentive plans for low-level employees and the paucity of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) contracts, where agents are compensated for the performance they achieve measured relative to the performance of their peers. In this paper I oer and then test in a laboratory experiment a preferencebased hypothesis that contributes to the solution of both puzzles. I assume that agents prefer to be both wealthier in absolute terms and wealthier than their peers. Moreover, I assume agents to be risk-averse in both absolute and relative wealth. I dene an agent for whom these two assumptions hold true as relative-wealth concerned. I then show theoretically that relative-wealth concerned agents prefer positive correlation between their payos as, for example, in the case of rm-wide stock option plans. Also, under these assumptions I show that agents are averse to negative correlation between their compensations, as in the case of RPE contracts where an agent's remuneration is reduced as his colleagues earn more. The experimental results provide evidence in support of the relative-wealth concerns hypothesis. In addition, I nd that women appear to be concerned about other agents' payos more than men.
The rst puzzle is that rms routinely tie compensation to the overall rm performance for employees who cannot possibly inuence such performance, even when their individual outputs are observable and contractible. This practice conicts with the well-known results of Holmstrom (1979) , who shows that performance-linked contracts should be used only when the performance measure conveys a signal about the eort exerted by employees. If employees cannot aect the performance measure, the rm cannot gain any knowledge about their eort. Moreover, risk-averse employees require a risk premium as a consequence of the volatility of their performance-linked payo.
As a result, compensation schedules based on uninformative performance measures are more costly than a xed wage and do not provide employees with any incentive. There is no conclusive evidence of the reasons behind this puzzle. Oyer (2004) and Oyer and Schaefer (2005) suggest that the rm-wide use of incentive contracts 1 is motivated by the opportunity to tie worker wages to the uctuation of their reservation utilities, which avoids costly wage renegotiation. Core and Guay (2001) hypothesize that stock option plans are a channel through which the company can be nanced by its own employees.
2 Kedia and Rajgopal (2008) nd that social forces justify the geographical clustering of stock option plans.
The second puzzle is the scarce use of RPE contracts in compensation practice, which appears surprising in the light of the results of Holmstrom (1982) . If employees' outputs are aected by common random shocks, then paying based on relative performance nets out the common noise source and provides the rm with a more precise signal of the eort exerted by each employee. Despite this argument, RPE contracts are rarely used in practice. The literature has provided relatively little evidence on the reasons behind the paucity of RPE use as a compensation instrument (Murphy (1999) ). Hall and Murphy (2003) suggest that accounting rules may drive compensation practice away from RPE instruments like market or industry indexed options.
3 Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) justify the lack of use of RPE contracts as a consequence of strategic interaction between competing rms. Bandiera et al (2005) nd that the enforcement of collusive agreements between employees justies the scarce resort to RPE contracts within a rm.
In this paper I oer and test a preference-based hypothesis that reconciles economic theory with observed practice. Suppose that individuals' utility increases in both their absolute wealth and their wealth measured relative to their peers. Suppose further that, in addition to being risk averse in their absolute wealth, agents are also risk averse in their relative wealth. If both assumptions hold true for a group of agents, I dene them as relative-wealth concerned. Since positive correlation between payos 1 By incentive contracts the authors mean compensation contracts that link the employee payo to the overall rm performance.
reduces the volatility of relative wealth, while negative correlation increases it, the relative-wealth concerned agent will prefer positively correlated payos to negatively correlated ones. I also show that relative-wealth concerned agents prefer a moderately volatile payo over a risk-free payo of comparable value, as long as the volatile payo is positively correlated with the payos of their peers. In a companion paper (Miglietta (2009) ) I derive the optimal linear contract that a principal oers to a body of relativewealth concerned agents: they are compensated on the basis of both their individual performance and the overall rm performance. In the same paper I show that, in the presence of relative-wealth concerns, the informational advantages of RPE contracts may be outweighed by the additional compensation cost induced by agents' aversion to negative correlation.
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The above theoretical results are a direct consequence of agents being relativewealth concerned. Hence, any attempt to validate the theory must rst nd evidence of relative-wealth concerns in agents' preferences. Since archival data provide extremely noisy information on agents' preferences, a laboratory experiment is the most promising way to investigate this subject fruitfully. I run seven experimental sessions with college students as participants. In the rst three sessions, half of the participants receive a random payo and they can choose a level of costly eort 5 in order to modify the probability distribution of their payos. The other half of the participants can choose between a risk-free payo and a risky payo but they do not choose a level of eort.
In the second part of the session, their payo choices are dierent; they can choose between three possible payos: a risk-free payo and either one of two risky payos, one positively correlated and the other negatively correlated with the payo of another agent. Along with this change in the payo choices, participants are given the possibility 4 The optimal compensation in the presence of other-concerned preferences is studied by Frank (1984a Frank ( , 1984b . The author shows that if agents are concerned about their relative wage, then the wage distribution among workers is less dispersed than the distribution of their marginal productivity.
More recently, Fershtman et al (2003) study the impact of relative-wealth concerns on the optimal contract oered to an agent, in a multi-principal/one-agent context. 5 Participants by spending dierent amounts of money can induce dierent probability distributions over their payo. This is a simple way to replicate eort exertion in a laboratory environment.
to observe other subjects' payos. The objective of these initial sessions is to ascertain whether subjects modify their choices once they move from a non-social context, where no correlation and no observation is allowed, to a social one, where correlation between payos and observation of other agents' payos are allowed.
Should participants choose dierently in a social context, I further need to test whether this modication in their choices is indeed driven by relative-wealth concerns.
For this reason, I run four additional experimental sessions. In these last sessions, I try to separate participants that are relative-wealth concerned from those who are not, and verify that the rst behave consistently with my theoretical predictions. The key to achieving this goal is to track whether subjects observe their peers' payos. The experimental design is such that the observation of other subjects' payos should not convey economically relevant information. Hence, by choosing to observe other subjects' payos a participant signals that she is concerned about her relative payo.
The experimental results show that in the social context agents choose a risky payo more frequently than in the non-social context. In particular their most frequent choice is the positively correlated payo. Most importantly, participants who observe the payos of other subjects, signaling in this way stronger relative-wealth concerns, show a signicantly stronger aversion to negatively correlated payos, consistent with the relative-wealth hypothesis. Additionally, I nd no signicant impact of relative-wealth concerns on agents' eort choices.
The experimental approach has been frequently used in the analysis of behavioral theories in labor economics and compensation. Fehr et al (1996) run a laboratory experiment and argue that fairness concerns induce employers to oer employees rents above their reservation utility (see also Akerlof and Yellen (1990) ). Charness and Kuhn (2007) study experimentally how the eort exerted by an agent is inuenced by relative compensation, nding no signicant impact. My results contribute to this literature by adding evidence about agents' correlation preferences.
Another aspect I examine is whether women's eort and payo correlation choices dier from the choices made by men. 6 My results suggest that women are more concerned about other agents' payos than men. In fact women have stronger preferences for positively correlated payos than men. Furthermore, women choose a higher level of eort when they move from a non-social context to a social one, while male participants do not show any signicant change in their eort choices.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 I derive the theoretical predictions that will allow me to test the presence of relative-wealth concerns in a laboratory setting. Section 3 describes the experimental approach. Section 4 develops the hypothesis tested within the experimental framework, and Section 5 analyzes the results of the experiment. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preferences with Relative Wealth Concerns
Throughout this work I contrast two alternative assumptions for agents' preferences.
The rst one is that agents are self concerned, that is, they are only interested in their wealth. Therefore, the preferences of a generic agent i are represented by:
In this case agent i's utility function is additively separable in the (possibly random) monetary payment t i and in the costly eort e i ∈ {e l } l=1,2...N . The function u(·) is increasing (u > 0) and concave (u < 0), and the cost function c(·) is increasing in its argument.
The second hypothesis is that agents are relative-wealth concerned. Under this hypothesis, the preferences of the generic agent i are represented by the following expected utility function:
6 The dierences between men and women in their attitudes toward other agents is the subject of a number of experimental studies. Eckel and Grossman (1998) nd that women are more generous (seless) than men. On the other hand, Bolton and Katok (1995), do not nd any gender-related dierence in the behavior of participants. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) , nd that women tend to be more equalitarian in their choices (that is, they tend to equally share), while men seem to polarize around either a completely seless or selsh behavior.
In this case, agent i's utility function is additively separable in monetary payments t i , eort e i and, assuming that agent i is assigned to a group of two people, his relative payo (t i − t j ) (where j indicates the individual with whom agent i is matched). The function u(·) is increasing and concave. Function g(·) is increasing (g > 0) and concave (g < 0) as well. These assumptions imply that agents are risk averse not only in their absolute wealth but also in their relative wealth. 7 The coecient β i ≥ 0 measures how concerned an agent is about his wealth measured relative to his peer's wealth. Finally, notice that (1) is a particular case of (2), when β i = 0. I will indicate agents whose utility is given by (2) and with β i > 0 as relative-wealth concerned. The wider class of preferences that are impacted by the choices or the payo of other agents, even without any impact on the agent's wealth, will be indicated as other-looking or other-concerned preferences.
The objective of this study is to investigate how relative-wealth concerns might induce risk-averse agents to prefer volatile payos, and to understand the impact of relative-wealth concerns on the eort exerted by agents. For this reason I will consider two types of agents. The rst type of agents receives incentives, in that by exerting more or less eort they can induce a dierent probability distribution over their payo outcomes. Since they can induce a dierent probability Distribution over their payo, the rst type of agents will be indicated as agent D. Agents of the second type do not receive any incentive and they can just choose to exert a xed eort. Also, they can choose whether to receive a xed payment or a payment that is positively or negatively correlated with the payment of agent D. Since the agents of the second type can choose the Correlation of their payos they will be indicated as agents C. Within this simplied framework, I derive some testable implications of the presence of relative-wealth con-cerns and contrast them with the implications of the alternative preferences hypothesis, namely, the self-concerned preferences.
Assume that all agents are assigned to a group of two people where every agent C is matched with one agent D. Also, assume that each agent D makes his eort decision and that the agent C rationally expects it. Given the eort agent D exerted, he can receive a random monetary transfer t D
Then we have the following: Proposition 1. If agent C's preferences are represented by (2) , and she is matched with an agent D whose payo is given by (3), then 1 . Agent C will prefer a moderately volatile payo t C with expected value t over a risk-free payo of t, if t C is positively correlated with agent D's payo. 2 . Agent C will be more averse than a self-concerned agent to moderate volatile payos that are negatively correlated with agent D's payo. 3 . There exists a unique random payo t * 
Proof of Proposition 1 . See Appendix Proposition 1 tells us that, if agent C is relative-wealth concerned, she will always prefer a slightly volatile payo that is correlated with the payo of her D counterpart rather than a risk-free payo with the same expected value. Point 2 of Proposition 1 follows from the fact that the concavity of function g(·) amplies the aversion of agent C beyond the risk aversion implied by the concavity of u(·). Finally, the last point of the proposition tells us that if agent D is receiving a specic random payo, a hypothetical principal has a unique payo to oer agent C, and the payos of the two agents will be positively correlated. The rationale behind this result is fairly simple:
when agent C receives a risk-free payo and her D counterpart receives a risky one, this will induce volatility in her relative wealth. Given the concavity of agent C's utility function in her relative wealth, she will be willing to pay a premium in order to reduce the volatility of her relative wealth. Of course, by stabilizing agent C's relative payo a principal induces volatility in her absolute wealth. Hence in order not to introduce too much volatility in agent C's absolute wealth her payo will be moderately volatile.
The optimality condition in (4) implies that as β C increases the agent will be less concerned about the volatility introduced in her absolute payo and more concerned about stabilizing her relative wealth. Last, notice that the optimality condition in (4), includes the self-concerned solution. By setting β C = 0, the optimality condition would Turning attention to agent D, his eort choice is driven by two motivations, the rst one is to increment the expected utility originating from his absolute wealth and the second is to increment the expected utility originating from his relative wealth. 
eort exerted by agent D increases or stays the same.
2. In the matched status, when his C counterpart chooses a risk free payot, the eort exerted by agent D is the same or higher than the eort exerted by D when his C counterpart chooses a positively correlated payo
3. In the matched status, when his C counterpart chooses a risk free payot, the eort exerted by agent D is the same or lower than the eort exerted by D when his C counterpart chooses a negatively correlated payo
Proof of Proposition 2 . See Appendix Point 1 of Proposition 2 tells us that moving from a stand-alone case to a matched case, the incentives to exert eort are strengthened by the fact that agents can now also become richer than their peers. Point 2, tells us that when in a matched status agents C choose positively correlated payos, the incentives for agent D to exert eort in order to become richer than his peers become weaker. If they become weak enough, then he might choose to exert a lower eort than in the case of uncorrelated payos. The investment that maximizes the expected payo is 300 Points (yielding an expected net payout of 450 Points), while the investment with the lowest expected payo is 500 Points (yielding an expected net payout of 350). Investing the lowest amount (250 points) yields an expected payout of 400 points. In terms of the riskiness of the payouts, the standard deviation from the lowest and highest investments are 230, while the standard deviation from the 300-Point investment (yielding the highest expected net payout) is 250. Therefore, a risk-neutral agent concerned only about his own wealth will invest 300, while a risk-averse agent concerned only about the expected utility of his own wealth will invest either 250 or 300, but should not invest 500.
Participants assigned to role C can take part to a decision round by spending 100
Points. If a participant C decides to participate to the round, she can choose between two dierent payos: the rst is a xed payment of 475 Points, the second is a random payo. The random payo consists of a payment of 500 points with probability 0.5 and a payment of 450 with probability 0.5. Therefore, the random payo has the same expected value as the risk-free payment (475 Points) and a volatility of 25 Points. So a risk-averse participant should choose the risk-free payment while risk-neutral participants should be indierent between the two payos. The sequence of actions in a given round is the following:
1. Participants C make their payo choice: receive a risk-free payo or a risky payo.
2. Participants D make their expenditure choice.
Payos are realized
After the rst seven decision rounds, agents were randomly re-assigned to role C or D.
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Once participants are assigned to their new roles, they will take part to seven additional decision rounds. At the beginning of each round agents are randomly assigned to a group of two people, where one has role D and one has role C. The random re-assignment is such that participants were never matched with the same counterpart more than once.
The expenditure decisions and the probability distribution of the payo received by participants D are the same. On the other hand, participants assigned to role C can now decide to receive three alternative payo: a risk-free payment of 475 Points, a random payo positively correlated with the payo of the participant D they were matched with, or a random payo negatively correlated with the payo of the participant D they were matched with. The expected value and the volatility of the payo received by a participant C in a given round are reported in the following 23 25 23 Negative Corr. 23 25 23 Suppose that C chooses to be positively correlated with participant D, then if participant D receives a payo of 500 Points at the end of the round, C will receive a payo of 450 Points, or if agent D receives a payo 1000 Points at the end of the round, C will receive a payo of 500 Points. If C chooses the risk-free payo, she will receive 475
Points at the end of the round, independently on participant D's payo.
Finally, in the second part of the treatment I introduce an observation option for both participants in a given group: participants D can decide to observe whether their C counterpart chose an uncorrelated, positively correlated or negatively correlated payo, before they make their expenditure decisions. Agents C, at the end of the round, can decide whether to observe the payo received by their D counterpart. Hence the sequence of choices in a given round for the second part of the experiment is the following:
1. Participants are randomly assigned to a group of two people.
11 Of course, the expected value depends on the expenditure choice made by the D counterpart.
tively or negatively correlated with their D counterpart's payo.
3. Participants D decide to observe or not the choice of their C counterparts.
4. Participants D make their expenditure choice.
5. Payos are realized.
6. Participants C decide to observe or not the payo of their D counterparts.
The Experimental Design
The experimental sessions were run at the California Social Science Experimental Labo- At the beginning of each session, instructions were read from a stage to participants.
The instructions covered the rules of the game and described the functioning of the computer Graphic User Interface (GUI). A sample copy of the instructions is in the online appendix.
13 After the instructions were read, participants played one practice round for which they received no payment. After the rst seven decision rounds, another set of instructions was read to the participants, and then subjects completed the last seven decision rounds. • If agents D are self concerned they will spend 300 Points (or 250 Points if they are extremely risk-averse) and will not change their expenditure decision moving from the rst part of the experiment (where participants are in a stand-alone situation) to the second (where participants are matched in groups of two).
• If agents C are self concerned, in the rst part of the session their choice should be driven by risk-aversion in absolute wealth. The same should be true for the second part. That is the ratio between agents choosing the risk-free payo and the risky payo should be left unchanged between the two parts.
Considering the First Treatment, in order for the agents' choices to be consistent with • If agents C are relative-wealth concerned, then they will prefer a payo posi- 
. Therefore the larger β C , the stronger the incentive for a relative wealth concerned agent C to choose a positively correlated (and moderately variable) payo ( > 0) and to refuse a negatively correlated payo ( < 0).
likelihood of a participant to make a choice, I estimate a linear-probability model. In particular, I will regress the indicator function of agents making a particular choice on a number of independent variables.
16 I also run a logit regression with random eects (unreported) and the results are consistent with the linear-probability regressions. The main drawback of the linear approach is that the coecients might be such that the tted probability can become negative or bigger than 1, for a subset of values taken by the independent variables. Nevertheless, in the linear probability model the magnitude of the estimated coecient gives a more intuitive understanding of the impact of the regressors on the probability of the agent making a specic choice.
First Treatment
The Moving from the stand-alone status to the matched status, male participants assigned to role D do not change their investment choice, while female participants increase their investment.
The results for agents D in the First Treatment are summarized in Table 1 . The most frequent choice is the 300-Point investment. This is not surprising since the 300-the presence of random eect at 1% signicance, through a Lagrange multiplier test.
Point investment is the choice that guarantees the highest expected net payo. What is not in line with the expected payo maximizing behavior is that agents seem to prefer the 500-Point investment choice over the 250-Point investment, although the lower investment oers a higher expected payo at the same risk. The bias towards the 500-Points investment may be justied by behavioral aspects such as optimism of the agents when they evaluate their expected payo or a probability weighting that overweights the likelihood of positive outcomes. The fact that participants choose to invest 500 Point rather than 250 Point seems not to depend on other-looking preferences: in Panel A of Table 1 , even if the frequency of the 250 investment in the rst part is twice the frequency in the second part, the chi-square and F-exact test statistics show that the dierence between the choice frequencies in the two parts is not signicant.
Nevertheless, Panel B and Panel C of Table 1 show that moving from a stand-alone to a matched status introduces a signicant change in participants' choices once the results are separated by gender, while the frequency distributions over investments are not signicantly dierent for men and women in the rst part of the session (stand-alone), they diverge the second part (matched). In particular, the frequency with which women choose the 500-Point investment increases by more than 20% in the matched case, and it is accompanied by a decrease of around 15% in the 300-Point investment. The change in female participants' choices are inconsistent with the hypothesis of self-concerned preferences: women choose the investment option with the worst expected net payo (500 Points) and they do so by reducing the frequency with which they choose the option with the highest expected net payo (300 Points). Overall, by this rst analysis, we can draw a rst conclusion that female participants, when assigned to role D, seem to be more other-concerned than male participants, who, in turn, appear to act more in accordance with self-concerned preferences.
Considering the linear probability model in the case of subjects D, the explanatory variables of interest are:
• Gender of the participant: female (0) male (1).
• The fact that the choice is made in the rst part (0) or the second part (1) of the 21 session.
• Whether the participant D observed a positively correlated choice by his C counterpart (1) or not (0).
• Whether the participant D observed a negatively correlated choice by his C counterpart (1) or not (0).
• Whether the participant was assigned to role D in both parts of the session(1) or not (0).
Panel A of Table 2 Result 2.
Moving from a stand-alone status to a matched status, participants assigned to role C change their payo choice. More participants choose a variable payo instead of a risk-free payo. Also, female participants choose a positively correlated payo more frequently than male participants.
The results for agents C in the First Treatment hint in a stronger way at the existence of other-looking preferences. Panel A of Table 3 shows that in the rst part of the sessions 38.29% of the participants choose the risk-free payo while 61.71% choose the risky payo. Moving from the rst part of the session to the second part, where agents C have the possibility to decide to be correlated, the percentage of participants choosing the volatile payo increases by 20%. Panel B and Panel C of Table 3 show that male and female participants C appear to behave similarly both in the rst and the second part of the session when we just consider the choice between a xed payo and a variable payo. However, Panel C of Table 3 shows that women choose the positively correlated payo more frequently than men (72.86% for women and 48.57% for men).
Considering now the choices of participants C, I regress the indicator function of them choosing risky payo over a risk-free payo on the following variables:
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• The fact that the choice is made in the rst part (0) or the second part (1) of the session.
• The fact that the participant observes the payo received by her D counterpart
(1) or not (0).
• Whether the participant was assigned to role C in both parts of the session (1) or not (0).
The second regression in Table 4 18 , shows that moving from the rst to the second part of the sessions, increases the frequency of the choice of variable payos. 
Second Treatment
The First Treatment, in particular in the case of participants C, provides us with evidence that participants are not self-concerned. Nonetheless, it does not allow us to discern whether this result follows from relative-wealth concerns as in (2) Result 3.
The introduction of observability does not induce any statistically signicant dierence in the overall frequency distribution of the investment choices for participants D.
Nonetheless, considering only female participants, they choose the 500-Point investment more frequently than male participants.
The results in Table 5 show that about 60% of the participants chose the 300-Point investment, that is, the expected payo maximizing choice. Nonetheless, the frequency of the 500-Point investment is almost 10% higher than the frequency of the 250-Point investment, showing a slight bias towards over-investment as in the First Treatment.
The introduction of observability has no signicant impact on the overall investment choices made by participants as it is shown in Panel A of Table 5 . Nevertheless, Panel C of Table 5 shows that female participants choose the 500-Point investment more frequently than male participants, but only in the second part of the sessions. This result is similar to the one observed in the First Treatment. Finally the regression analysis in Table 6 conrms the eect of gender on the probability for a participant to choose the 500 Point investment. 
Result 4.
If a participant C observes the payo of her D counterpart, the likelihood that she chose the negatively correlated payo decrease. Also, female participants are more likely than male participants to choose a random payo as opposed to the risk-free payo. In particular, women choose more frequently the positively correlated payo.
From an inspection of Panel A of Table 7 , it seems that there is no signicant dierence in agents' choices between the rst and the second part of the session. Once I break down the frequencies by gender in Panel C of Table 7 , it is apparent that female participants change their behavior in the second part of the session. They abandon the risk-free payo choice and increment their choice of positively and negatively correlated 19 I do not include the regression for the 300 and 250 choices, since there is no signicant eect of the independent variables I consider on the investment choice.
payo, being the positively correlated payo the one they choose more frequently (56%).
Male participants do not change their behavior between the two parts of the session.
Once again, it seems that there is a strong gender eect and that female participants have more other-concerned preferences. Nonetheless, there is the concern of a small group of individuals driving the results, therefore a complete analysis requires to control for individual eects. The most relevant result is reported in Table 8 . First, male participants choose a risk-free choice more frequently than women, which is consistent with men being more self-concerned. Moreover, women choose the positively correlated payo more frequently than man, showing a higher degree of other looking concerns than men. Somewhat surprising is the fact that women also choose the negatively correlated payo more frequently than male participants. Nevertheless, the most frequent payo choice made by women is by far the positively correlated payo.
The most interesting result of this work comes from the consideration of the observation activity of participants C. Panel A of table 8 shows that the observation of the payo by agents C impacts on their probability to choose a positively correlated payo (which signicantly increases if they observe), and the probability of participants C to choose the negatively correlated one (which signicantly decreases when they observe).
A further analysis shows that the result is mainly driven by the aversion of observing participants to negatively correlated payos. In particular Panel C of Table 8 shows that the likelihood of the choice of a negative correlation payo is decreased by the fact that the agent observes the payo of their counterparts. The fact that an agent observes her counterpart's payo seems not to explain why she prefers a positive correlated payo over a risk-free payo. One possible explanation is that for a relative wealth concerned agent, the worst choice is the negatively correlated payo, therefore this is the choice agents will avoid more strongly. An alternative explanation is a risk-aversion argument: by selecting a positively correlated payo, relative wealth concerned participants C increase their expected utility on the one hand, but on the other they increase the volatility of their payo. Hence these two eects may oset each other and make the estimator of the coecient more noisy. The negatively correlated payo, though, decreases the expected utility of a relative-wealth concerned agent more sharply than in the case of a simply risk-averse agent (point 2 of Proposition 1), therefore a relative wealth-concerned agent will be more averse to negative correlation than an agent who is simply risk averse.
Once again, we should not be surprised that the results are stronger for participants C than for participants D. In fact a relative wealth concerned agent C, and more precisely an agent who is risk averse in his relative wealth, is always better o by being positively correlated with his peer's payo (as long as no additional volatility is introduced in his absolute payo ). Agents D, on the other hand, might not be responsive to correlation choice even though they are relative wealth concerned, if their incentive compatibility condition is not binding or near-binding.
Conclusions
In this paper I investigate the impact of relative-wealth concerns on the preferences of agents for positive correlation and aversion to negative correlation between agents' payos. In particular, I assume that agents' utility functions are increasing in their absolute wealth as well as in their relative wealth. In addition I assume that agents are risk averse in both absolute and relative wealth. Under these assumptions I show that agents prefer positive correlation between payos and are averse to negative correlation between payos. I then test this prediction in a laboratory experiment and nd that agents indeed prefer positively correlated payos. Moreover, agents who observe their peers' payo, showing concerns for their relative payo, are signicantly less likely to choose negatively correlated payos. These ndings support the hypothesis that relative-wealth concerns play a signicant role in explaining why rms use extensively prot-sharing and broad-based incentives (since they induce positive correlation between payos) and rarely employ Relative Performance Evaluation contracts (which induce negative correlation between payos).
This work also contributes to the experimental literature on compensation by di-rectly addressing the question of agents' preferences for correlation between payos.
Previous works mainly focuses on how fairness concerns and reciprocity shape the relationship between a principal and an agent: Feher and Falk (1998) nd that agents reciprocate a generous oer by a principal by exerting a higher than minimal eort.
Feher et al (1996) show that employees may refuse wages higher than their reservation utility if they deem the oer to be unfair. Charness (2004), addresses the question of whether agents attitude towards a given payo may be inuenced by the fact that it is oered by a person rather than by a random process. The author nds that agents reciprocate more an oer received by an individual rather than an oer received by an external process. More related to this work is Charness and Kuhn (2007) that studies the impact of social forces between employees rather than a vertical relation between employees and employers. In their paper the authors nd that relative compensation has no impact on the level of eort exerted by agents. These contributions are based on theoretical grounds similar to the hypothesis of relative-wealth concerns, nevertheless they do not directly test preferences of agents for correlation between their payos and the payos of their peers.
The experimental approach also allows me to overcome a problem that compensation studies encountered when addressing the subject of RPE compensation. The fact that RPE contracts are scarcely used in practice, strongly limits the possibility to investigate this issue through archival data. In an experimental setting I can exogenously oer negatively correlated payos to the agents and study under what conditions they will refuse them.
One more aspect I investigate is how gender inuences agents' preferences for payo correlation and their eort exertion. I nd that women change their behavior more sharply than men when they move from a non-social context to a social one. In particular they increase their eort and choose more frequently a volatile payo, in particular if positively correlated with the payos of their peers. These results suggest that in organizations where the presence of women is higher, we should observe a wider use of rm-wide incentive contracts and a higher level of eort exerted. These predictions have interesting analogies with the ndings of Adams and Ferreira (2008) about genderdiverse boards of directors. The authors nd that women have higher attendance rates to board meetings than men, and they are more involved in committee activities than their male colleagues. Moreover, the authors nd that the proportion of female directors is associated with more equity-based pay for directors. This evidence, far from being conclusive, opens promising perspectives for the study of the relation between gender and compensation policies.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
I will rst show that if agent C preferences are represented by (2) and if she is matched with an agent D who can receive a payo as in (3), then C will prefer to receive a payo that is positively correlated with agent D's payo rather than receive a riskless payment with same expected value. Without loss of generality, assume that the participation for the agent has no cost. If agent C receives a risk free payo equal tot, then her expected utility will be:
Consider now an alternative payment t C such that
where > 0 and 1 > p > 0.
The expected utility for agent C is now
Consider now the dierence between the expected utility undert and t C :
approximating the above expression, for small values of
which follows from the concavity of g(·).
The proof for point 2 can be obtained by following the same steps as in the proof of point 1, and by choosing < 0. In this case the rst-order approximation of dierence in the expected utility, moving from a risk free payo to a moderately random payo that is negatively correlated with the payo of agent D is given by
While the rst order eect for a self-concerned agent would be just 0.
The uniqueness of the agent payo that minimizes the expense for a hypothetical risk neutral and self concerned principal, follows from the solution of the following
where U is the reservation utility of the agent. First of all, notice that the participation constraint has to be binding otherwise for the principal is always possible to reduce t H C or t L C and make the participation constrain bind. Given the binding condition, we can compute the following implicit derivative:
Applying the chain rule we also have
Substituting (5) into the above, we nally obtain
it is convenient for the principal to decrease t L C and increase t
, it is convenient for the principal to decrease t H C and increase t L C . The optimal payo t * C for the principal, given the payo for agent D,
. The uniqueness of t * C follows from
= β C Point 1. can be proved by considering the stand-alone IC condition. Agent D will choose to exert eort e i if
When agent D is matched with an agent C, the incentive compatibility condition becomes:
Therefore, while the IC conditions in the rst inequality of (6) will be still holding in the rst inequality of (7), some of the IC condition represented in the second inequality of (6), might be violated.
This last circumstance would induce the choice of a higher eort. Point 2. can be proved in a similar fashion, assume that agent C receives a risk-free payot, then an agent D will choose an eort level e i if the IC conditions in (7) are respected once we set t
Assume now that agent C chooses a payo t C = t 
Given (9), the set of conditions represented by the last inequality in (8) will still hold. On the other hand if the left-hand side of (9) is larger enough than the righthand side, than some of the conditions in the set of conditions represented by the rst inequality in (8) 
Exact
P r < 0.01 * * * P r < 0.01 * * * Table 2 First Treatment -Agent D Regression Analysis. Panel A reports three separate linear probability regressions. The rst one reports the impact of gender (Male=1 Female=0), the fact that participants where playing the rst 7 or the last 7 rounds (First Part=0 Second Part=1), the fact that a participant observed the payo correlation choice of her counterpart (Positive or Negative), and the fact that they where assigned to role D for both parts of the session (Same Role) on the probability of D choosing a 500-Point investment decision. The second regression reports the impact of the same variables on the probability of D choosing a 300 Point investment decision, while the third regression reports the impact of the same variables on the probability of D choosing a 250 Point investment decision. Panel B reports two linear probability regressions estimates of the impact of the independent variables on the probability of participants choosing the 500 Point investment over the 300 Point investment, and on the probability of participants choosing the 250 Point investment over the 300 Point investment. Panel C reports the same estimates as in Panel B, using observations from the second part of the sessions. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
Pr (Investment) = α i + β 1 * M ale + β 2 * Second + β 3 * Obs P os + β 4 * Obs N eg + β 5 * Same Role 11.97% 4.39% Table 3 First Treatment -Agent C Frequencies. This table reports the relative (absolute) frequencies of agents C choosing xed or variable payos in the First Treatment. Panel A reports the payo choices for the rst and second part of the session. Panel B reports the payo choices broken down by gender in the rst part of the session. Panel C reports the payo choices broken down by gender in the second part of the session, also the choices are further broken down in positive or negative correlation payo choices. The Chi-square and the F exact statistics P-values are reported. Table 4 First Treatment -Agent C Regression Analysis. This table reports two linear probability regressions. The regression estimates the impact of gender (Male=1 Female=0), the fact that participants were playing the rst 7 or the last 7 rounds (First=0 Second=1), the fact that a participants observed the payo of their counterpart (Observation=1 No-Observation=0), and the fact that they where assigned to role C for both parts of the session (Same Role) on the probability of C choosing a variable payo over a risk-free one. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Table 5 Second Treatment -Agent D Frequencies. This table reports the relative (absolute) frequencies with which participants D choose an investment of 250, 300, 500 points in the Second Treatment. Panel A reports the investment choices for the rst and second part of the session. Panel B reports the investment choices broken down by gender in the rst part of the session. Panel C reports the investment choices broken down by gender in the second part of the session. The Chi-square and the F exact statistics P-values are reported. 
P r < 0.01 * * * P r < 0.01 * * * Table 6 Second Treatment -Agent D Regression Analysis. This table reports a linear probability regression relating to sessions of the Second Treatment. The regressions estimates the impact of gender (Male=1 Female=0), the fact that participants were playing the rst 7 or the last 7 rounds (First Part=0 Second Part=1), the fact that a participant observed the payo correlation choice of his counterpart (Positive or Negative correlation), and the fact that they were assigned to role D for both parts of the session (Same Role) on the probability of D choosing a 500 Point investment decision. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Table 7 Second Treatment -Agent C Frequencies. This table reports the relative (absolute) frequencies of agents C choosing a riskless payo or a payo positively or negatively correlated with his D counterpart, in the Second Treatment. Panel A reports the payo choices for the rst and second part of the session. Panel B reports the payo choices broken down by gender in the rst part of the session. Panel C reports the payo choices broken down by gender in the second part of the session.The Chi-square and the F exact statistics P-values are reported. 
P r < 0.01 * * * P r < 0.01 * * * Table 8 Second Treatment -Agent C Regression Analysis. Panel A reports three separate linear probability regressions. The rst one reports the impact of gender (Male=1 Female=0), the fact that participants where playing the rst 7 or the last 7 rounds (First=0 Second=1), and the fact that a participant observed the payo of his counterpart (Non observation= 0 Observation=1), on the probability of C choosing a negatively correlated payo vs. the other payos. The second regression reports the impact of the same independent variables on the probability of C choosing a positively correlated payo vs. all others, while the third regression reports the impact of the same independent variables on the probability of C choosing a xed payo vs. all others. Panel B reports two linear probability regressions. The rst regression reports the impact of the same independent variables on the probability of C choosing a negatively correlated payo vs. a xed payo, the second regression reports the impact of the same independent variables on the probability of C choosing a positively correlated payo vs. a xed payo. Panel C reports two linear probability regressions considering observation from the second part of each experimental session. The rst regression reports the impact of three variables on the probability of C choosing a negatively correlated payo vs. a xed payo, the second regression reports the impact of the same three variables on the probability of C choosing a positively correlated payo vs. a xed payo. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
Pr (P ayof f ) = α i + β 1 * M ale + β 2 * Second + β 3 * Observation + β 4 * Same Role 
Yes Yes
Yes Yes 21.16% 10.65%
